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R E F L E C T I O N S A N D N A R R A T I V E S
Brushed-Off Testimony
Stanley L. Brodsky, PhD, and Dustin B. Wygant, PhD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 40:562–5, 2012
In line with years of tradition, soldiers young and old
come together at the local pub or hall to swap war
stories of time in the trenches. For the forensic clini-
cian, the trenches represent the hard-fought battles
during expert testimony. As it turns out, our pub was
a social gathering at the 2012 meeting of the Amer-
ican Psychology Law Society in San Juan, Puerto
Rico. The University of Alabama Psychology Law
Program hosted a social gathering for its faculty,
graduate students, alumni, and friends to come to-
gether and share stories and camaraderie. It was in
this setting that we launched into a spirited discus-
sion of similar experiences testifying in rural county
courts.
The Brush-Off: The Principle
When expert witnesses are called to testify, they
routinely experience challenging and difficult events.
For example, emotionally charged and complex
cross-examinations are common. Queries about the
scholarly foundations of professional practices fall
like raindrops. Postponements, delays in being called
to the stand, and lengthy sidebars are part of more or
less predictable and sometimes annoying events at
trial.
There are also occasions when experts are faced
with dismissive and peculiar parameters instituted
by the judge, a pattern we both have come to think of
as brushed-off testimony. Such testimony is charac-
terized by the presence of at least some of these five
elements: a level of informality is present, well be-
yond what is typical or expected; the judge appears to
have a dismissive attitude toward the expert; when
testifying, the expert may be instructed to stand in
front of the bench, rather than be seated in the wit-
ness stand; the judge and other courtroom actors
display a palpable disregard for the conclusions and
opinions of the expert; and the entire proceeding is
of a rushed and superficial nature in which mini-
mal opportunity is available to provide meaningful
testimony.
We found that we could illustrate the characteris-
tics of brushed-off testimony and concluded that we
had similar suggestions for how testifying experts can
respond personally after finding that their testimony
has been brushed off.
Herein, we each recount, in the first person, trial
experiences that illustrate the concept of brushed-off
testimony. Then, we jointly present our conclusions
and suggestions for others who find themselves
caught in similar situations.
Case One (Brodsky)
Base Rate Information
When discussing an anomaly, it is useful to com-
pare it to normal events. In Alabama, strangers as
well as experts are treated with remarkable kindness
and politeness. The same qualities of kindness and
graciousness I have seen in rural Alabama over the
years have also been typical of my experiences in
Alabama courts.
There have been exceptions. Former governor
George Wallace and I stared each other down on one
occasion. Dressed in a dashiki and with an Afro hair-
style that stood up in a foot-high halo around my
head, I had joined a line of people waiting for Wal-
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lace’s autograph in a program marking the dedica-
tion of a building. He stared at me for perhaps 30
seconds. I stared back. Finally, in a gesture of mock
civility he said, “Y’all have a good day,” and signed.
He showed disapproval, certainly, but not a brush-
off. At a rural diner, when a colleague and I were
especially hairy and hippie-looking, we were told that
the diner was out of food, no matter what we or-
dered. It was part of the adversarial vocabulary that
acknowledged our presence, but they took no formal
action to move us on. In courtrooms, however,
judges have been consistently polite, welcoming, and
often chatty. That’s why the brushed-off experience
stands out so clearly.
Joining the Gang
I arrived at the single courtroom to provide expert
testimony in the sentencing hearing of a defendant
with whom I had completed a forensic evaluation. It
was in the mostly empty courthouse of a rural county
of about 20,000 people in central Alabama. The
courtroom was empty, too, apart from a cluster of
people gathered around the judge’s bench. Spotting
me entering the courtroom, the defense attorney for
the person accused of murder rushed to meet me. He
led me by the arm to the group standing in a half-
circle, speaking quietly to the judge.
I was placed in the center of the group of perhaps
15 people. I knew the defendant and the defense
attorney who had retained me. He whispered the
names and roles of some of the participants without
explaining why they were present. The convicted co-
defendant (and spouse of the defendant) in his white,
soiled prison uniform stood close in, handcuffed and
shackled. The attorney for the state stood nearby.
The family members and minister of the defendant
were there, too. The family members of the deceased
victim joined the half circle. Two police officers
stood among us, one close to the co-defendant.
Other people standing alongside were not identified,
but one seemed to be a news reporter.
I was sworn in by the judge who made no eye
contact with me. The defense attorney sped through
a few questions, hardly touching on the pathological
background of the defendant, my assessment proce-
dures, my forensic interview, the specific psycholog-
ical measures I had used, my synthesis of the data, or
the conclusions presented in my report. The report
had been conveyed to the attorney several months
earlier, but here he mostly ignored it. He asked five
questions, all of which were about my conclusions.
He tried to introduce my qualifications, but the
judge waved him off. The state’s attorney asked a
single question about whether I had testified in court
before.
To me, there were many findings from the assess-
ment that were related to the sentencing at hand. But
after 15 minutes, the judge concluded that phase of
the trial. It is common for expert witnesses who are so
inclined to second guess rulings of the court, but it is
rare that such efforts have much payoff. However,
the procedures left me stunned. Why was everyone
standing around? Why had the judge seemed so re-
sistant to allowing my complete testimony? I had the
impression that my testimony had been ignored and
was not valued. While we all stood there, the judge
pronounced the severest possible sentence on the de-
fendant.
Afterthoughts
I don’t dwell on things. Within an hour, the court
appearance had left my mind, only to pop up unex-
pectedly now and then. One such pop-up moment
was when my colleague Dustin Wygant and I were
sharing our war stories. With that stimulus, I have
revisited my brushed-off testimony.
I do not narcissistically assume that the court
should accept and act on my every word. When I
testify, I appreciate that my place in the legal process
is limited and focused. I am not one of those who
prefer not to know the outcome of the hearing or
trial. I am curious, but I am not invested in the out-
come as a sign of the worth of my efforts.
Sometimes judges (or juries) and I agree. Some-
times we do not. In this case, my appearance proba-
bly made no difference. The judge did not even pay
lip service to the possibility that my testimony might
have contributed something substantive.
The presence of a crowd around the judge’s bench
told me that the judge was speeding up the process.
Testifying while standing gave the same impression.
I have watched experts testify standing in Great Brit-
ain, New Zealand, and Australia. I have nothing
against standing. However, this testimony was an
improvised event, and improvised acts have a
thrown-together quality.
Did the judge owe the defendant more than he
gave her? I think so. Justice on a moving sidewalk
seems strange and strained. However, the judge did
not owe me anything. I am clear that I was a guest in
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the courtroom. Hosts have great latitude in how they
treat their guests, and abrupt and arbitrary behaviors
are within the judge’s purview.
In Chelsea Hotel, the Leonard Cohen song about
his brief fling with Janis Joplin, Cohen closes with, “I
remember you well in the Chelsea Hotel, that’s all; I
don’t even think of you that often.” That’s how I
reflect on this brush-off. I remember it well, but
don’t dwell on it. It may be appropriate to add one
concluding thought: that’s the way it should be.
Case Two (Wygant)
“Just stand up here and tell the judge what you
think . . .”
My case took place in a small rural county circuit
court in eastern Kentucky. I had evaluated a defen-
dant charged with multiple counts of felonious
burglary for competency to stand trial and criminal
responsibility. In conducting his assessment, I diag-
nosed the defendant with mild intellectual disability.
Despite his disability, I had opined that he was both
competent to stand trial and that the data could not
support an insanity defense. Consequently, the de-
fense attorney did not issue a copy of my report to the
judge. However, she believed that some of my find-
ings might offer mitigating information to the court
during the sentencing hearing in the form of dimin-
ished capacity during the commission of the offenses.
The defendant had been convicted of all charges.
There were two co-defendants in the case, both of
whom had been evaluated at the state’s forensic psy-
chiatric facility. Neither of the co-defendants had
been found incompetent to stand trial or insane.
There were three separate defendants in the case,
each represented by different counsel. Neither of the
co-defendants had called expert witnesses. I recog-
nized early on that my position in the courtroom was
marginalized when I heard one of the attorneys of a
co-defendant say, “I heard you brought some damned
shrink here to make us all look bad.” He did not
realize that he had made the comment in front of me.
Both attorneys for the co-defendants were able to
get their cases heard by the judge first. On each oc-
casion, the attorneys put forth little effort in arguing
mitigating factors for the judge to consider (e.g., first
major criminal charges, low average IQ, or promise
of restitution). Shortly before I was set to testify, the
attorney who retained me approached and said that
she was not sure whether I would have any impact in
the case, since the judge had already sentenced each
of the co-defendants to nine years’ imprisonment.
Nevertheless, she wanted to proceed and called me to
the stand.
I still considered myself somewhat of a novice in
court. While I had worked in forensic psychology for
six years (including an internship and postdoctoral
training), I had been called to court only a handful of
times and never in Kentucky since relocating there. I
felt a twinge of excitement and nerves as I saw the
players take the stage. At the last moment, however,
the attorney who had retained me came over and
informed me that I would not be delivering my tes-
timony in the witness box. Quite unexpectedly, she
said, “We’re just going to have you stand here and tell
the judge what you think.”
I have to admit that I was taken aback. Constancy
and anticipated rituals before testifying have always
calmed me, so this change was unnerving. At first I
thought, ‘Okay, this is a little strange; now what do I
do?’ I approached the bench. The court stenographer
turned on a white-noise generator so that the court
audience could not hear my testimony. The defense
attorney stood to my left and the prosecutor to my
right. The judge looked askance at me during my
testimony with one hand holding up his head, giving
an appearance of profound disinterest. Perhaps most
unnerving was that the defendant was nowhere in
sight. Before I began speaking, I turned around and
saw him standing about 30 feet from me. It seemed
odd to me that the man I would be describing to his
sentencing judge wouldn’t even hear what I had to
say about him. Adding to the unusual aspects of the
experience, at no point was I asked to raise my right
hand or affirm a sworn statement. ‘Just tell the judge
what you think’ ran once more through my head.
‘Okay,’ I thought, ‘where and how do I begin?’
Before I said anything, the defense attorney began
with a statement, “I’m going to ask you a couple of
background questions,” and launched into some very
brief qualification queries. The prosecutor and judge
had no questions about my professional background.
The defense attorney then asked me questions about
my involvement in the case and the methods I used
to examine the defendant. When I began to describe
using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
IV), the judge spoke up for the only occasion during
my testimony, and said, “Doctor, we don’t need to
know about the test procedure, just tell us his scores.”
Well, that struck me as obtuse, considering that the
Brushed-Off Testimony
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WAIS is a rather complicated instrument and that
some of the subtleties of the results influenced my
clinical opinion.
The defense attorney proceeded to ask me ques-
tions that I had prepared with her before the trial.
One difficult element of the experience was that I
didn’t know whom to look at while answering. I
wanted to maintain eye contact with the judge when
delivering my responses, but he appeared detached
and uninterested. After offering information about
the defendant’s capacity during the offenses, the
judge turned to the prosecutor and, addressing her
by her first name, asked, “Do you have anything you
want to add to the questions?” She promptly re-
sponded, “I have no questions for him.” “You’re
dismissed, doctor, thank you for coming today,” the
judge quickly replied. From start to finish, my ap-
pearance took seven minutes.
I was shocked by the experience. I should have
been relieved. The testimony was over and I had
survived. But did I even fight? A feeling of disap-
pointment quickly overshadowed my sense of relief.
I had something to say in this matter. At least I
thought I did. I had met with the defendant on three
occasions during the evaluation. I interviewed his
sister and mother. I reviewed many records and dis-
cussed my findings with his attorney in five or six
phone calls. Adding to the frustration, I had taken
two of my graduate students with me while I con-
ducted the evaluation. I saw the experience as an
opportunity to mentor my students on psychological
and forensic assessment, case conceptualization, and
testimony preparation. Both of these students were
in the courtroom as I testified. What would they
think of the matter? One feeling that came to mind as
I walked away from the judge was embarrassment,
particularly as my students watched me approach
them. I had spent the car ride over to the court reit-
erating to them the importance of what we can do as
forensic psychologists. Now, in light of my disap-
pointing experience, I felt as if I had lost credibility
with my mentees.
I later heard from the defense attorney that her client,
too, was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment.
Our Conclusions
These two vignettes describe incidents that took
place in small rural communities in which major
criminal trials are infrequent. Nonetheless, the expe-
riences may have some broader implications for ex-
pert witnesses. Here are six interrelated lessons that
we draw from brushed-off testimony.
It can be an exercise in humility. As Gutheil and
Simon1 have noted, it is easy for experts to slip into
narcissistic postures. Being dismissed in the ways
noted in the two case studies has a major corrective
influence. The old saying goes, anxiety is the natural
antidote for anxiety. We would add, having one’s
testimony brushed off is a compelling antidote for
narcissism.
Such experience reminds us that we are guests in
somebody else’s house. The rules of the house govern
all guests, and as master of the domain, the judge tells
us where to stand and what to do. When in Rome . . .
It’s not about our special expertise. When Joel
Dvoskin and Stanley Brodsky led a workshop on
court testimony in 2008 at the annual meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Dvoskin sang a
song he had written, titled, “It’s not about you.” One
of his lines noted that mental health expert testimony
is like the footprints left by a defendant’s muddy
boots and no more.
Don’t take it personally. There is a tendency for
experts to assume that this kind of judicial apathy or
dismissiveness is related to who they are. Our obser-
vations were that it made no difference who we were:
experienced or novice witness, big-city or small-town
expert. The judges were simply acting according to
their own wishes. Our privilege is to participate, re-
flect, and tell the story.
Still another lesson is preventive. Well-prepared
experts insist on meetings with retaining counsel to
go over the findings and anticipate difficulties in tes-
timony. With this kind of preparation, there is a
possibility of having a joint strategy for addressing
dismissive judges.
Finally, both of these stories illustrate a lack of
respect for substantive content in expert testimony,
an attitude that does a disservice to defendants and to
the integrity of the judicial process as a whole. Ex-
perts must remain in their roles as objective evalua-
tors and not cross lines in the realm of advocacy
during testimony. Nevertheless, one adaptive option
is to act, on a very small scale, Paul Revere-like, call-
ing out about the hazard by writing about it here for
our colleagues and for ourselves.
References
1. Gutheil TG, Simon RI: Narcissistic dimensions of expert witness
practice. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 33:55–8, 2005
Brodsky and Wygant
565Volume 40, Number 4, 2012
